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Credit Apartheid, Migrants, Mines and Money 
Deborah James* and Dinah Rajak** 
 
London School of Economics/Wits University School of Social Sciences, and Sussex University 
  
Migrant life has long required a careful balancing of responsibilities. Migrants travel to 
earn a wage in a capitalist economy while saving resources and honouring obligations 
which arise in a seemingly less-than-capitalist one. Various agents – rural patriarchs, 
traders, government authorities, appliance retailers – have used techniques to keep 
wages beyond migrants’ control. Paradoxically, similar techniques have, on occasion, 
been eagerly embraced by migrants themselves, who know that these resources will need 
to be husbanded for the upkeep of home. This article explores these contradictions, 
showing that recent forms of debt build on expectations born of forms of credit that 
proliferated earlier, but differ in consolidating these forms of credit to produce an 
unimpeded flow of money into migrants’ bank accounts and out of them again. It looks at 
the advantages and dangers of the recent expansion of credit to constituencies – like 
migrants – where it previously did not reach. 
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The 2012 killing of platinum miners during a strike at Marikana was a cogent reminder that 
labour migration remains a salient part of South African life. It also revealed that the conditions 
of migrant life remain deeply problematic and in some ways have worsened or intensified. 
Among other factors that prompted the strike was an exponential proliferation of credit sources – 
including from microlenders practising unsecured lending – and hence a sharp increase in the 
indebtedness of migrants taking up offers of loans. That money is lent with such readiness is no 
accident: creditors can secure repayment with extraordinary ease. Miners’ pay, automatically 
transferred into their bank accounts at month-end, is effortlessly removed from these again by 
those to whom they owe money. Two principle technologies of repayment prevail. One system – 
used by informal moneylenders or ‘loan sharks’ – involves keeping borrowers’ ATM cards and 
using these to withdraw funds, with interest of amounts of up to 50 per cent per month, from the 
cash machine at month-end. The other – used by banks, retailers and the new wave of 
microlending businesses that have sprung up since 1994 – is through direct debits, or by using 
and abusing the practice of garnishee or emoluments attachment orders. If a creditor is owed 
money and presents an employer with a garnishee order, the employer is obliged to enable that 
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creditor to take a portion of the debtor’s monthly pay before the employee receives it. The 
monthly earnings of miners, other migrant wage-workers, and workers and salary earners more 
generally, have been the principle targets of lenders who have been using these repayment 
technologies with ever-increasing frequency. The accumulation of multiple debts, paid back to a 
series of creditors in rapid succession as soon as payday arrives, means that many earners have 
little left to live on. While extending access to the formal credit facilities previously denied to 
black South Africans was an important aspect of the new financial inclusion which replaced 
credit apartheid, the Marikana episode suggests that its disadvantages outweigh its benefits. 
The other factors underlying the episode should not, of course, be ignored. There is 
evidence, for example, that since the widespread dip in employment following the country’s 
liberalisation in the 1990s,1 each wage-earning migrant and/or miner is supporting a wider range 
of kinsmen than previously, with each pay packet required to go further (Beinart this Special 
Issue; Stauffer 2010). This has been accompanied by widespread casualisation. In the mining 
industry, there has been a steady increase in the use of sub-contracted labour. Where previously 
sub-contractors were employed for the short-term work of shaft sinking, while the majority of 
underground mineworkers were on permanent contracts with the mine, the core workforce of 
many mines now comprises large numbers of workers on lower wages and flexible contracts 
(Crush et al. 2001).2 Mineworkers, previously seen to benefit from greater levels of security and 
unionisation than other areas of wage labour, are thus now facing conditions of precarity. 
Although one must certainly acknowledge that mineworkers at least ‘have jobs’ (Beinart this 
Special Issue), where many others are unemployed, it is partly the fact of their regular pay, 
ironically, that makes them vulnerable to the financial depredations described here. 
The free market-style opportunism which led to the growth of informal and semi-formal 
microlending, alongside and inextricable from their formal financial counterparts such as banks, 
vehicle finance companies and retailers, has not gone unnoticed. After the Marikana killings, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry decried lenders’ ‘outright preying on the vulnerabilities of low 
income and working people’ and undertook to implement more controls on those who make a 
living as lenders.3 Efforts had already been made, in the wake of South Africa’s democratic 
transition, to regulate and control the ‘reckless lending’ of money at interest, notably through the 
National Credit Act (NCA), effective from 2007. Although some of these practices were always 
borderline illegal, and others were newly outlawed, most continue unhindered.  
 
 
In seeking to explore how these borrowing, lending and repayment activities have taken 
root, despite attempts at regulation, it is necessary briefly to consider the phenomenon of 
financialisation – of which these practices seem to be a logical outcome – which is said to have 
taken hold in the South African economy in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Barchiesi 2011; 
Marais 2011:124–8, 132–9).4 Seen from creditors’ point of view, the term describes a new 
‘pattern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through financial channels 
rather than through trade and commodity production’; seen from that of borrowers, it means that 
they are ‘confronted daily with new financial products’ (Krippner 2005:173–4), and that those 
previously unschooled in matters of saving, borrowing and repaying are enjoined to become 
‘financially literate’ (Krippner 2005:173–4), often actively modelling their use of money along 
more formal lines in what has been called ‘financialisation from below’ (Krige forthcoming).  
These tendencies are evident in the way both smaller microlenders and larger corporate 
lenders – and both informal and formal creditors – have penetrated and capitalised on the many 
financial dealings and activities of wage earners in South Africa: from mobile money 
transactions and payday loans to business start-ups, micro-insurance, low-cost mortgages and the 
securitisation of migrant remittances (Hudson 2008; Krige 2011; Roy 2010; Schwittay 2011; 
Soederbergh 2013). While such initiatives have been lauded by some for being inclusive and for 
serving to democratise credit, for enabling the banking of the unbanked, and for opening up 
borrowing to those at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ or BoP (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:89; 
Prahalad 2004), it has not gone unnoticed by others that ‘the effects of financialization … have 
been highly detrimental to significant numbers of people around the globe’ (Epstein 2005:5). 
On top of these worldwide trends and effects, aspects of the national legal landscape 
arguably disadvantage borrowers still further. Overall, South Africa’s legal framework has been 
noted as consistently advantaging creditors (Boraine & Roestoff 2002:4), and as providing little 
in the way of affordable bankruptcy or insolvency options for those, such as low-wage earners, 
who owe amounts of less than R50,000 (Schraten 2013). These factors make fairness for debtors 
difficult to pursue. Although recent attempts at regulation and reform, by the state in partial 
collaboration with the non-governmental sector, have been driven by a recognition that people 
need protection (even perhaps from their own profligacy), this has so far not managed to derail a 
deeply-rooted system of ‘external judicial control’ over wage-earners’ finances (Haupt et al. 
 
 
2008:51), often keeping them at arm’s length from their pay packets and making even basic 
financial literacy less likely than it might have been.  
This article provides an account of the origins of that system. In doing so, it seeks to 
transcend dichotomous views which either celebrate or condemn the recent expansion of credit. 
Instead it analyses them ethnographically and historically. Based on the authors’ field research in 
Soweto, Rustenburg and Mpumalanga, and on literature which gives an account of earlier 
practices, it traces whether and how this newly proliferating set of borrowing and lending 
practices echoes earlier, apartheid- and segregation-era forms of saving, credit and debt (here 
glossed as credit apartheid). It shows how many of the main features of capitalism, including 
unbridled indebtedness, were already in evidence at around the turn of the 19th century. Various 
businessmen – from big capitalist corporations and companies to small-time traders and 
entrepreneurs – made profits from lending to a range of clients. Among those prospective 
borrowers sufficiently well-heeled to buy property, a system of mortgage finance was in place, 
together with the robust repossession of real estate from those unable to keep up with payments. 
Humbler people, including labour migrants, were having loans extended or advances granted to 
them by recruitment agents and then finding themselves having to work for a lifetime to pay 
these off. As time went by they started to rely on more apparently informal means of managing 
money, such as savings clubs and burial societies, later combining this with the purchase of 
movables on hire purchase (which were similarly subject to repossession when default occurred) 
and making use of bank accounts.  
The increasing ease with which money can be (and is) borrowed in the present day thus 
builds on expectations born out of earlier forms of credit/debt. But contemporary borrowing and 
lending is also different in some ways. Varieties and sources of credit have expanded on the one 
hand, while, on the other, money is concentrated through the use of technological formats so as 
to make it flow unimpeded through bank accounts. The article proposes that, in bringing 
economic inclusion, these processes have also re-inscribed older economic inequalities and 
created new economic vulnerabilities. There has been a progressive movement away from a 
more personalised to a more formal and financialised system – one less subject to influence, 
evasion or resistance on the part of the consumer. But certain informal techniques and strategies 
co-exist with these. As borrowers explore new forms of consumption they retain or newly 
develop a desire for continuity in socio-economic process. Alongside the move by the retail 
 
 
sector to formalising and streamlining credit rather than relying on repossession, and by the 
banking sector to encourage everyone to open a bank account, the informalisation of money-
lending practices has been proliferating and intensifying. 
Instead of tracking a single process of financialisation or formalisation, then, the article 
uses an approach that draws from recent writings in economic anthropology, which show how 
state-regulated and legal/formal economic arrangements interpenetrate with those less visible and 
less regulated (Hart 1973; Hart et al. 2010; Guyer 2004; Shipton 2007, 2009, 2011). It draws in 
particular on Jane Guyer’s proposal that we reject binary assumptions, in which capitalism on the 
one hand is counterposed against local economic activities which resist it on the other. And it 
follows her suggestion that we explore how dynamic processes of formalisation are extended 
‘piecemeal’ rather than uniformly and in a homogenising manner (Guyer 2004:157). 
Formalisation and informalisation thus interact with each other, producing a complex plurality. 
 
The New Lending 
While the ending of credit apartheid – like that of apartheid more broadly – progressed in gradual 
steps, certain developments in the post-1994 period were more dramatic (Porteous with 
Hazelhurst 2004:77). As black consumers began to take advantage of new credit opportunities, 
sectors of the white community started microlending businesses to cater to and exploit this new 
market. State policies, during the 1990s, enabled such developments by liberalising the economy 
and, more specifically, by lifting previous legislation governing ‘usury’ which had restricted the 
interest rate (James 2014:65). Characteristically countering market-driven impulses with 
regulatory ones, the government then sought, during the 2000s, to regulate the negative effects of 
this borrowing by passing new legislation to outlaw ‘reckless lending’ with its new National 
Credit Act.   
The result of these developments was the emergence of three lending sectors: 
mainstream/formal financial; registered microlenders; and community moneylenders or ‘loan 
sharks’. Each, plugging gaps left by the other two, was supplying this new market in its own 
way, and came to define itself in contrast to the others – although borrowers, ignorant of the 
legislation, did not always distinguish clearly between the second and the third of these. First, 
and biggest, is the mainstream/formal financial sector, historically dominated by British-owned 
banks and rooted in the English-speaking capitalist sector (Verhoef 2009:157, 181); the ‘big 
 
 
four’ banks – ABSA, First National (FNB), Nedbank, Standard – took the lion’s share. They 
offer credit cards, housing loans and vehicle finance. The sector also features store cards for 
clothing and food and hire-purchase loans for furniture and appliances. Some recent additions, 
originating in the second sector (below), have joined this mainstream corporate sector. They 
include African Bank and Capitec, both of which explicitly aim to cater to the low-income 
earning population. (The unsustainable character of the unsecured lending activities of the 
former, in particular, were exposed when in 2014 it sought a bailout from the government, 
causing Moody’s to downgrade the credit ratings of the ‘big four’ banks in turn.).5 Perhaps more 
surprising, certain ‘home-grown’ yet equally corporatised players are claiming an increasing 
share of the BoP financial products market by targeting similar constituencies. Foremost among 
these has been the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and Chamber of Mines’ joint 
corporate venture, the Ubank (see below). By leveraging proximity to, and (at times 
personalised) knowledge of, individual constituents, this move by the NUM marks a broader 
transformation in the relationship between union and workforce, redefining worker 
empowerment as financial opportunity, while turning members into clients/customers. Second is 
the new microlending sector, offering mostly smaller and short-term loans. It grew exponentially 
in the 1990s and was mostly run by Afrikaans-speaking former civil servants who invested their 
redundancy packages in these businesses. They did so after leaving state employ when the 
African National Congress (ANC) became the ruling party. Having at first been allowed to 
charge ‘uncapped’ interest rates, and to engage in practices – such as the use of borrowers’ ATM 
cards by way of loan security – that were later prohibited, many of these subsequently registered 
as microlenders under the Act, which obliged them to charge monthly interest of no more than 
44 per cent. Third are the mashonisas or neighbourhood moneylenders.6 Growing rapidly since 
the 1980s (Siyongwana 2004), this sector came to be defined by its difference to its newly-
registered and hence legal counterpart: its protagonists, in contrast, were defined as loan sharks 
because they remained unregistered under the act and continued to charge monthly rates of 
interest as high as 50 per cent. The bigger mashonisas have continued to ensure repayment by 
using the ATM-card-confiscation technique: something that had been outlawed for use by those 
who had resolved to practise as registered – and more ‘formal’ – microlenders. 
Possible sources of credit have thus proliferated since the end of apartheid. A consumer is 
able to borrow from many banks, use many credit cards, buy a car with finance and furniture on 
 
 
hire purchase, and hold store cards from an array of retailers, as well as having access to 
microloans both legal/formal and illegal/informal. Lenders such as Ubank offer short-term loans 
which promise to offset high fees with free airtime and discount vouchers for retail outlets and 
bus companies.7 Often, consumers, having been able to take out loans with very few checks 
being made on their income or credit-worthiness, borrow from one source in order to repay 
another: a practice that has not noticeably reduced despite the passage of the act (James 2014:85, 
157). At the same time the means by which these debts are collected has shrunk drastically. 
Advanced IT systems, rooted in apartheid’s preoccupation with surveillance, were put in place, 
aimed at making it possible to use a single hi-tech system for identification, cashing in social 
grants, buying and banking (Breckenridge 2005:272–3, 2010) and even opening up the 
commercial use of such data (Breckenridge 2005:281). Within the mining industry specifically, 
the system of migrant labour recruitment through TEBA (formerly The Employment Bureau of 
Africa, established in the 1920s to recruit labour for the mines), coupled with the policing of 
domestic space in the hostel compound, has relied on a hi-tech infrastructure for identification 
and surveillance which fuses employment ID with financial ID. Identification and surveillance of 
employees’ financial lives is facilitated, and the NUM’s own Ubank is ideally placed to move in 
on this terrain. Such technologies overall have played their part in transforming what were 
previously distinct ‘pockets’ of finance into one single flow. Sources of credit, then, have 
become more diverse, but modes of collection have narrowed and become streamlined.  
Recent changes thus affect how migrants use their money; how widely they are required to 
redistribute it; how much of it they can save; and – especially – whether their outgoings exceed 
their income.  
 
Credit Apartheid – A Historical Perspective 
From soon after the onset of proletarianisation, a variety of agents and forces attempted to cajole 
black cultivators to become wage-workers in the mine economy. Success in doing so was not 
guaranteed, but where this was accomplished, the regular payment of wages opened up a stream 
of income for small-scale traders. At the same time, South Africa’s patterns of racialised land 
ownership and exclusion were gradually being put in place, eventually yielding a situation in 
which blacks were moved into reserve areas (later ‘homelands’). The resulting relations of debt 
and credit differ markedly from the situation well-documented in many South East and South 
 
 
Asian countries, where relationships combining paternalistic dependence and exploitation 
developed between tenants and their landlords – who doubled as their creditors, and where 
landlords often cultivated that dependence, milking their borrower/tenants dry over several 
generations (Murray Li 2010; Martin 2010; Mosse 2004; Shah 2010). South Africa had a more 
definitive land dispossession, yielding less personalised debt relations. More often than 
landowners, it was traders and recruitment agents, and later the owners of companies and large 
corporations who were the major lenders; but alongside these, especially since the early 1980s, 
local community moneylenders have become a prominent feature of life, alongside the recently 
formalised microlenders. 
Following colonial conquest, black people in South Africa – especially those who were or 
would later become members of the emerging middle class – made efforts to procure their own 
land in the late 19th and early 20th century. Some were granted title in recognition of their 
former occupancy (Murray 1992:37–44), others formed syndicates and bought land via 
missionary and other intermediaries (Cobley 1990:157; James 2007:53; Trapido 1978:28). Given 
the extent and influence of 19th century mercantilist capitalism in the region (Trapido 1978), 
opportunities for land speculation were considerable, and some of these black owners either lost 
their land after having borrowed against it (Beinart 1986:265; Beinart & Delius 1986:24) or 
willingly sold it to pursue education and other modern investments (Murray 1992).  
The subsequent passage of several draconian laws in 1913 and 1936 – although they took 
decades to fully enact – secured most farmland for white owners. The eventual commercial 
success of some of these farmers depended not only on those laws but also on other measures, 
including putting pressure on black occupants to become rent- or labour-tenants who, while 
continuing to cultivate, also worked for farm owners (Beinart & Delius 1986:33–4; James 
2007:6, 39, 131–9; Trapido 1978:30–1). Other measures were the provision of state subsidies; 
and the establishment of state marketing boards (Beinart & Delius 1986:29–42; Morrell 1986). 
Credit was given on favourable terms to white farmers and was withdrawn from black ones 
(Beinart & Delius 1986:29–30; Morrell 1986:379–80; for an earlier period see Ross 1986:68–
70). For blacks who remained on the farms attempting to cultivate, increasing restrictions on 
their time and decreasing access to the market – and to credit – eventually caused many to leave 
for the reserves, far from urban centres of commerce. The town-ward migration of many then 
began in earnest.  
 
 
Cultivator households still based on the land, with some household members travelling to 
town to work as migrants, were restricted to borrowing from traders, or buying on credit from 
them (Krige 2011:137; Van Onselen 1996:253; Whelan 2011:88–9, 93–4). Access to such 
traders was differentiated depending on whether borrowers resided in white farm areas (Van 
Onselen 1996) or in the ‘native reserves’ (later homelands) (Beinart 1979; Whelan 2011). The 
racial/ethnic profiles of these merchants, in a setting where many occupations were restricted and 
hence defined in such terms, also differed from one place to another. Merchants belonged to the 
established white settler constituency in some places (Beinart 1979, 1986:266–7; Roth 2004:62; 
Whelan 2011), but other merchants, from ethnic minorities – Gujarati-speaking Muslims from 
the Punjab and Jewish refugees from Russia and its borderlands – sold (and lent) to blacks in 
areas where their counterparts from more majority settler backgrounds did not venture (Cobley 
1990:43; Krige 2011:137). Such traders were not, however, necessarily exploitative; indeed they 
were ‘often sympathetic’ to their black customers, themselves being ‘emigrants from societies 
dominated by peasant economies’ (Van Onselen 1996:186). Some traders’ enterprises remained 
as small ‘native’ trading stores (and mine shops), probably combining such sympathy with profit 
in a fine balance, while others expanded and grew into large retail companies (Kaplan 1986:327). 
These retailers later took to selling their goods on hire purchase (Kaplan 1986:167; Phillips 
1938:40–1); and profit eventually outstripped more personal considerations. 
Showing less evidence of sympathy and more of profit, there were elements in settler 
society that directly profited by linking lending with labour recruitment. In Pondoland before 
about 1913, rural cultivators were induced into work contracts or tempted to leave employment 
in one sector in favour of another, by local traders, doubling up as semiformal recruitment 
agents, who gave ‘cattle advances’ against migrants’ future earnings (Beinart 1979). In other 
settings – such as Bechuanaland (now Botswana), a British Protectorate at the time – labour 
agents recruiting for the South African mines ‘induced’ black cultivators to enter into contracts 
by paying them wages in advance, thus indebting them (Schapera 1947:108). Both parties abused 
this system, with agents often extending such large advances that the borrower ‘remained in debt 
even after having worked for several months’, and with borrowers often accepting advances from 
several agents at the same time, with no intention of honouring their debts to any of them 
(Schapera 1947:109).  
 
 
To counteract practices which – if left unregulated – might have led to unsustainable 
levels of debt on one hand and to the collapse of agents’ enterprises on the other, a series of 
measures were put in place by the colonial authorities. Cattle advances, enabling rural patriarchs 
to control the wages of young men, were seen by officials as exploitative, and eventually 
abolished (Beinart 1979). But such prohibitions did not result in migrants’ getting free access to 
their earnings. Instead, a system developed of deferring part or all of miners’ pay rather than 
giving it to them at the work site (Schapera 1947:106–7; First 1983): the authorities feared that 
cash received immediately would be too readily spent or diverted from ‘legitimate’ uses – 
including the payment of various colonial government taxes and levies – or might encourage 
migrants to neglect or desert their families. An intermediary system of paternalistic control, 
which later developed in the context of life in the mining hostels or compounds, was that through 
which hostel managers attempted to monitor and manage the ‘responsible’ remittance of migrant 
miners’ meagre wages to families ‘back home’. 
A combination of free-wheeling enterprise on the one hand, and its regulation by 
paternalistic authorities on the other, thus laid the basis for a system in which wage earnings, and 
eventually the bank accounts used to transfer these, have been viewed as legitimately controlled 
and/or regulated from the outside. (The reliance on measures through which migrant earnings 
were subject to external or social control rather than being individually accessed by workers 
themselves, proved to be long-lived: garnishee orders might be seen as its most recent variant, 
see Haupt & Coetzee 2008). Such attempts to regulate both the excesses of capitalism and the 
profligacy of consumers, however, could alternatively be seen as representing just another 
version of something that migrants and miners have long practised on their own initiative. 
Making efforts to save their wages from immediate consumption, they have ring-fenced them, 
investing them to prevent them from being frittered away (initially in cattle, and later through 
fixed deposits, ‘lay-bys’ and furniture instalments) or turning them into a socialised asset by 
putting them into savings clubs.  
 
Banking and Saving: Work Cycles, Life Cycles and Marital Arrangements  
Migrants in need of systems for saving and transmitting money, long before ‘banking the 
unbanked’ initiatives were rolled out, have long been aware of and made use of them. Probably 
starting soon after labour migration itself, they have invested money in savings clubs. Founding 
 
 
and becoming members of what were known locally as stokvels, itimiti or megodišano – South 
African variants of a worldwide phenomenon – workers have grouped together to put aside some 
of their wages for specific purposes. Among Sepedi- and Ndebele-speakers, for example, 
groupings of men, mostly from the same village, formed rotating-credit clubs on the mines or, 
less formally, collected money to help return migrants’ bodies home for burial (Delius 1996; 
Lekgoathi 2006). Starting in a later period after female migrancy began in earnest, women’s 
clubs enabled members to pool their savings and gave each a turn to receive a payout (James 
1999:60; Mager & Mulaudzi 2012:308; Verhoef 2009): the enforced savings system was 
explicitly used by women as a means of disciplining themselves not to use money in other ways. 
More recently, some clubs have been used by men and women as a means to buy ‘big ticket 
items’ such as appliances, while others lend money at interest in an attempt to make the clubs’ 
money ‘grow’ (Bähre 2007). Alongside other arrangements, and themselves increasingly 
acquiring a formal and more evidently financialised aspect (Krige forthcoming), they have been 
one among many means of managing money. 
The use of bank accounts, although commencing more recently, has also served as a 
means of judiciously storing and managing money. For men now retired who worked on the 
mines or in industry, selective use of savings or transmission facilities became common, as 
fieldwork in Mpumalanga revealed. One former miner spoke of being given a pay-slip at month-
end which he would submit to the ‘time office’, exchanging it for cash. In some cases, he might 
deposit his pay in a building society account in order to put it aside, later drawing this out to buy 
telegraph orders from the Post Office which were sent home and which his wife could redeem 
locally (James 2014:108). In others, trusted drivers of mini-bus taxis were relied upon to 
repatriate earnings. Bank accounts were often used for saving, to hinder rather than enable an 
easy flow of money, or were opened and closed again as workers moved from one job to another 
or from rural to urban areas and back again. Sometimes the opening of a new account and the 
closing of an old one accompanied the switch from one spouse to another, or reflected the 
domestic distrust that went along with relationships that, although conflicted, were more long-
lasting. Bank accounts were single- rather than multiple-use, and often used for the way they 
blocked, rather than enabled, the ready flow of money.  
The use of bank accounts was combined with other arrangements, intricate and requiring 
considerable powers of recall to manipulate and manage: households used a complex portfolio of 
 
 
arrangements to manage their finances (Collins 2008 Collins et al. 2010). People with 
commitments to kin or spouses sometimes strategised to make their money inaccessible to these 
dependents, by putting it in fixed deposits, arranging with their employers to help them commit 
to enforced savings practices (Krige 2011:137), putting money aside with a retailer in the ‘lay-
by’ system (making a deposit on an item in the expectation of paying the rest of the price within 
a set time period or forfeiting the deposit (Roth 2004:72), or by paying instalments for furniture 
on hire purchase).  
Migrant labourers’ use of the banks thus reflected marital, spatial and temporal 
discontinuities. But as time went by, increasing numbers of employers during the 1990s rendered 
these strategies more difficult to pursue by requiring that wages or salaries be paid into bank 
accounts (Porteous with Hazelhurst 2004:77, 81). The government, attempting to enable 
regularity of payment, similarly encouraged pension and grant recipients to open accounts 
around the same time (Breckenridge 2005), then requiring all recipients to re-register in the 
2000s (Vally 2013). Being banked increasingly began to enable the unimpeded flow of money 
into the account at month-end, and out of it again. Wages paid directly into employees’ bank 
accounts enable employees to borrow without collateral or ‘use their expected wages as a 
collateral substitute’ (Roth 2004:78). What were wealth stores have gradually become wealth 
conduits, enabling creditors to reclaim their advances. Among these creditors are the new 
microlenders who, as outlined earlier, began their operations with the lifting of the restrictions on 
usury.  
Unexpected new players have also been drawn in to the lending landscape: most 
strikingly the NUM, which has turned its focus to a new programme of financial support and 
services for members. One of the most recent in the series of schemes to keep migrants’ wages 
from immediate spending, and a continuation of the kind of attitude that earlier found expression 
in ‘deferred pay’ (Schapera 1947:106–7), the NUM’s TEBA bank was established in 1976 as a 
savings initiative for mineworkers. Now transformed into the NUM’s own form of BoP financial 
innovation, it has been reconfigured as the Ubank. Established by the NUM’s fully financialised 
investment arm in partnership with the Chamber of Mines, the Ubank has become a major source 
of credit for mineworkers, aiming to offer a legitimate alternative to the loan sharks (see below) 
by providing an array of financial products from payday loans to small enterprise start-up loans 
to mortgages. ‘Our vision is to be the workers’ bank of South Africa’, Ubank’s then chief 
 
 
executive, Mark Williams, announced in 2010, as the bank embarked on an aggressive strategy 
of growth to augment its existing 500,000 clients by consolidating its dominance in mining 
communities and beyond.8 Initially dubbed the ‘workers’ bank’ – an ethical counterweight to 
corporate banks cashing in on lending to the poor – Ubank’s ‘moral highground’ (Schapera 
1947:106–7) seems to have become rather more precarious, as rank and file NUM membership 
have proved to be more the generators of profit than its recipients. Broadly speaking, this reflects 
a shift from a register of collective action and worker solidarity to the promotion of individual 
self-actualisation and economic empowerment in line with the national corporate-sponsored 
discourse of patriotic capitalism. The images of empowerment projected in Ubank advertising 
portray an aesthetic of new South African citizenship, embodying the core virtues/values of 
upward mobility, youth and entrepreneurialism. 
At odds with this aesthetic is the reality of life underground and in the shacks of the 
squatter camps where many miners live. For the poorest-paid mineworkers, and sub-contractors, 
low job security and low wages make repayment on an unsecured payday loan of up to a 
significant portion of the value of their net pay9 extremely difficult. Rock driller Mbuzi 
Mokwane claimed: 
 
My payday is the most miserable day for me … on the day you’re given a pay slip that 
says R4,000 [£300], you start to calculate your outgoings and you can go crazy. There is 
daylight robbery in the mines.10 
 
Heightened expectations spurred on by the post-apartheid promise of economic 
empowerment since democracy have put greater pressure on pay packets across the board 
(Daniels 2004:842; James 2012; Posel 2010), including for migrants themselves (Reddy 
2014:258). But testimonies of migrant miners at the bottom of the pay-scale and under 
conditions of increasing insecurity show that lending and indebtedness in this sector can often be 
less about pursuing mobility and the fulfilment of aspirations than about getting by and 
supporting increasing numbers of dependents at a distance. These demands mean that migrant 
mineworkers have proved a lucrative target for formal lenders seeking to ‘bank the unbanked’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Furniture and Hire Purchase 
Investing in items of furniture and appliances – fixed assets substituting as the ‘next biggest 
thing’ where other forms of property were disallowed, and enabling the decoration of council-
owned township houses in black townships – was a key aspect of the black South African 
experience, especially from the 1950s onwards. Pioneered in urban areas by town-dwellers 
seeking respectability (Krige 2011:138, 172), it was soon adopted by migrants as well. Where 
the latter had initially taken a conservative approach to investment in property and the purchase 
of material goods, often consolidating the wealth of the homestead by buying cattle (Ferguson 
1992), those migrating more recently have tended to favour the purchase-on-credit of household 
furnishings. A bride’s parents often provided an item of furniture as part of her trousseau, later 
investing in further items, paying each off in turn, with the eventual aim of equipping all rooms 
in the house. Although interest rates were and remain high (Schreiner et al. 1997), typically more 
than doubling the price, many householders have kept up their repayments in a prudent fashion. 
Furniture purchase thus contributed to a ritualised life-course as well as involving aspirations to 
sophistication and modernity. It exposed householders to gradually increasing expenditure, and 
expanding credit access, over time. Providing a means of ‘saving’ money by making it 
unavailable for other things, it could also however, when unregulated, lead to unsustainable 
levels of debt. 
This credit system mixed unlike styles. Meticulous record-keeping and mailing out of 
invoices in brown envelopes reminded purchasers of what they still owed, but trust was also 
important, since the social and geographical distance between retailers and their customers in 
villages made it necessary to rely on intermediary/agents and lent it a personalised dimension. 
Considerable profits could be made from by targeting low-paid black migrants, but relying on 
these buyers, with their low earnings and – in some cases – reluctance to keep up repayments, 
also made business risky for smaller retailers. The high costs of hire purchase compensated for 
defaults and helped pay for repossession operations. Success in making money in this sector 
(despite these problems) attracted much competition (Tlali 1979:26, 30, 116), which made 
business owners increasingly determined to increase their profit margins over those of their 
rivals while simultaneously reducing what they paid to employees and agents.  
Customers who might have fallen on hard times, when handed reminders of payment due, 
often threw them away or hid them under the bed, only to endure the shame of having items 
 
 
repossessed. The alternative – showing that ‘trust’ was often honoured more in the breach than 
the observance – was that some clients entered into ‘scams’ with agents or paid them bribes to 
depart (Cohen 2004:42–6; Tlali 1979:82–3). From the customers’ perspective, these forms of 
collusion were one way to escape the high interest rates charged. But such efforts did not 
necessarily make matters easier for customers. One such agent in a Mpumalanga village, despite 
having been fired by the retailer for crooked practice, continued to travel around to prospective 
customers, taking advantage of villagers’ ignorance of his dismissal and continuing to pocket the 
deposits they were paying in expectation that their furniture would be delivered. The agent later 
left the area to go into hiding in order to escape their wrath once villagers discovered his trickery 
(James 2014:105).  
By the early 2000s, despite banks’ efforts to abolish credit apartheid by extending 
financial formalisation to all sectors of society, this furniture hire-purchase system remained in 
place to some degree. Increasingly since the 1990s, however, migrant consumers have been 
getting into hock to clothing retailers via store-cards and to microlenders instead of, or as well as, 
to furniture retailers. Those buying appliances often now do so using microloans rather than 
procuring credit from the furniture stores themselves on hire purchase. Indeed, many of these 
retailers – such as members of the JD group – have branched out into financial services and 
microlending as an equally or more profitable aspect of the business. Lending has become 
increasingly financialised, and customers’ being banked means less risk to the lenders.   
 
Borrowing: Informal Moneylenders 
Informal moneylending has long been practised in South African township areas and rural 
villages alike. Not all accounts of this practice depict the lenders (mashonisas) as violent loan 
sharks, however (Krige 2011; Roth 2004; Siyongwana 2004). The structural factors glossed as 
credit apartheid have limited householders’ options to borrow from the formal sector at 
reasonable rates, inclining them instead towards illegal moneylenders. Such loans are often 
cheaper than those available from formal lenders who add extra charges to cover their 
administrative costs and to counteract the risks of non-repayment (Gregory 2012:394; Roth 
2004:52). Detlev Krige’s research shows that neighbourhood lenders often have a personal 
connection to borrowers. This community embeddedness helps to ‘cap’ the interest rate, since 
loans are intended to be repaid at month-end but lenders often extend the loan without 
 
 
calculating an escalation of the interest rate. Doing so would make repayment increasingly 
difficult for borrowers, thus giving the lender a reputation for unfairness, increasing the chances 
that violence be used against him, and prompting complaints to the authorities (Krige 2011:154–
8). Thus, ‘the termination of future contracts’ by community members acts to regulate such 
moneylending (Roth 2004:99), and calculation of profit is regulated by community-mindedness 
(Krige 2011:154–8). The desire of the mashonisa to stay in business controls the terms under 
which he seeks repayment.   
A generalised moneylending, less attached to specific individuals, became pervasive in 
urban townships and small-town settings in the former homelands from the 1980s onwards (see 
Krige 2011:136–81; Roth 2004; Siyongwana 2004). Borrowers and lenders cannot – except at 
the extreme ends of the continuum – be easily separated. Some start as one and later become the 
other; some are both but at different times and in different registers. Such lenders, operating 
beyond the system and aware of the illegality of their activities, nonetheless aim at greater 
economic formality themselves. Ironically, policy-makers’ attempts to ‘bank the unbanked’ were 
here at odds with state regulation of illegal moneylending. Rebecca Matladi, a teacher of 
financial literacy, was often approached by small-scale lenders for advice on how to bank their 
own proceeds and securely store the proceeds of their enterprise without drawing attention to its 
illicit character (James 2014:113).  
Smaller lenders often lend only small amounts and, being embedded in local 
neighbourhoods, must adjust their collection arrangements to fit in with local norms. They often 
lend amounts of less than R300, charge about 15 per cent interest monthly, are relatively flexible 
in the calculation of interest over time, lend to self-employed or low-paid people, and have no 
formal system of collateral. Such lenders do not compete with larger ones, their products are 
distinct and aimed at a different market (James 2012:25–6). But as moneylending expanded in 
size and remit, some lenders, modelling their actions on those of retailers in the formal sector, 
began asking the neighbours of prospective clients to stand surety, or started inventorising 
clients’ assets with a view to repossessing these in cases of default (James 2012:113).From the 
mid-1990s onwards when credit apartheid was, in theory, coming to an end (Siyongwana 2004), 
illegal moneylending with interest began to acquire its more financialised techniques, aping or 
consolidating those being used by the new microlenders which were to be outlawed at the end of 
that decade. Lenders ask borrowers for their ATM cards as loan security, later returning these to 
 
 
their owners after withdrawing the money owed to them on payday. Whereas banks and 
regulated lenders require a pay slip before agreeing to offer credit, informal lenders do the 
equivalent after the event, by taking the borrower’s card and withdrawing the money owed to 
them directly from the bank. (At month-end in some rural areas, people wanting to use ATM 
machines often find that these are being monopolised by mashonisas, who use a succession of 
cards from a variety of customers to withdraw what is owed to them.) Borrowers, shorter of 
money than previously, then often borrow again, once again yielding up their ATM cards (James 
2012:10, 2014:113). When they try to escape by cancelling their ATM cards at the bank and 
applying for new ones, lenders, aware that it is impossible to get a new ATM card without an ID 
book, retaliate by asking to keep their ID books as well. The result can be a debt-bondage cycle 
embodied by the term sekôlôtô (from the Afrikaans skuld, debt). Although, being in need, 
borrowers willingly participate in these arrangements, they gradually come to resent the fact that 
they are ‘working for mashonisa’.  
Many borrowers do not distinguish the registered, and more formal, microlenders (in the 
second sector discussed earlier) from the unregistered and illegal informal moneylenders or loan 
sharks (in the third one): they use the same word – mashonisa – to describe both. While small-
scale moneylending with a more neighbourly feel certainly remains in place, it is a more 
streamlined variety – with all the unsustainability that implies – seems to be on the increase, 
having escalated from the mid-1990s onwards (Barchiesi 2011:200, 210; Siyongwana 2004). The 
proliferation of such lenders, added to that of other possible credit sources, seems by many 
accounts to have contributed to the levels of indebtedness which caused such concern in 
Marikana.  
 
Housing, Property and the Migrant Conundrum 
Much decried by critics, the denial of property rights to black people in South Africa was an 
intrinsic element of credit apartheid. When migrants invested wages in buying furniture, this 
represented – among other things – a tacit recognition that titled property had been put beyond 
their reach. Instead of settling at their place of work, the prevailing structure of accommodation 
provided to lower-ranking migrants was one in which a resident was ‘expected to live as a 
“bachelor”’ within the confines of the hostel’ or compound, until he went on leave and returned 
‘“home” to visit his family’ (Ramphele 1993:20). While a strong commitment to supporting rural 
 
 
homesteads played its part in this system of oscillating migration (Reddy 2014:256–7), the 
inability to own accommodation at the workplace was thought to play its part as well.  
Under apartheid, the government had restricted the provision of family housing at the 
mines to no more than three per cent of the black workforce. The mining industry, sensitive to 
criticism that it had been complicit in perpetuating such a system and eager to erase the legacy of 
compounded labour, invested resources in upgrading hostel accommodation for migrant miners, 
restyling them ‘single accommodation villages’ (Anglo Platinum 2008). But, while hostels were 
improved, less progress was made in the provision of family housing to low-wage mineworkers; 
something that had been promised as far back as 1944 by the mining industry. The industry 
protested the government’s restriction on family housing, and expressed a desire to ‘experiment’ 
with settled labour at the mines, but failed to provide permanent family accommodation to even 
this small fraction of workers. In its submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) hearing on business, Anglo American notes this failure, referring to it as a ‘missed 
opportunity to oppose apartheid and hasten its demise’ (Anglo American 1997:12). Yet in the 
two decades following the end of apartheid, progress on the transformation to family housing has 
remained slow (Fassin 2007:186). 
Mining companies now make available, to permanent employees, a living-out allowance 
of around R1,800. Given the lack of rented accommodation, and the unaffordability of other 
options,11 miners mostly rent shacks from slumlords in the squatter camps at the mines. This is 
especially the case in and around Rustenburg and Marikana where the platinum boom between 
2004 and 2008 led to an inflation in the property market of over 100 per cent and a substantial 
shortage of low-cost housing. Pointing out that ‘many workers now have two families here and 
back home’, one migrant miner bemoaned ‘the past’ when the mine would supply a concrete 
‘bed’ and meals. ‘Workers could send home to the rural areas most of their pay … [Now] on our 
small wages we have to pay for our own beds and meals.’12 Since the late 1990s the numbers of 
miners opting to live outside the paternalistic confines of the hostels has multiplied, even though 
the ‘living-out allowance’ provided is too little to support a family, let alone multiple 
dependents. The choice was simple, says Prosper Masinga, a shop steward at the platinum mines:  
 
80 per cent I think live outside the hostels and many are in the informal settlements … if 
you live outside the hostels … you have your space. You have freedom.  
 
 
 
To counteract this defection of employees to the informal settlements, some mining 
companies have sought a solution not in the extension of company-owned family 
accommodation – which is available, for the most part, only to manager-level employees – but 
rather in the market; in this case the burgeoning market for low-cost housing construction and 
BoP mortgage facilities. Anglo Platinum, for example, has expressed its commitment to 
addressing the deep structural reliance on migrant labour, by launching a low-cost new home 
ownership scheme to support lower ranking employees on lower wages in order to enable them 
to buy a family house (Benchmarks Foundation 2012). However, critics point out that many 
miners prefer to invest their earnings in building houses back home, alongside education for their 
families (Reddy 2014:260). The company-provided houses are also, in the case of the platinum 
mines, often of sub-standard quality.13 Celebrated among BoP advocates as vehicles for 
democratising the housing market, providing financial security, agency and education to those 
who previously had no access to credit, such schemes often fail to account for the widespread 
experience of foreclosure in the so-called ‘subprime’ mortgage sector around the world. In the 
context of rising job insecurity in the mining industry and the precarity of migrant life, employer-
provided mortgages are likely to increase the vulnerability of migrant workers under the banner 
of delivering financial security and social cohesion. If schemes such as Anglo Platinum’s were to 
work, mining companies would recoup more in interest paid on mortgages over a longer period 
of time than it cost them to build the housing, not only externalising the costs of providing and 
building housing for migrant employees onto workers themselves, but profiting from it. As the 
Benchmarks Foundation puts it, ‘does this represent an investment by Anglo Platinum in the 
community, or is it a community investment in Anglo Platinum?’ (2012:54). All-in-all, housing 
has become a fulcrum of the new dimension of economic precarity among the migrant 
workforce, making it simultaneously the target of attempts at financial education and BoP 
investment, and the rallying point for a new social struggle as the emblem of economic exclusion 
in post-apartheid South Africa.  
The experience of migrancy by miners such as the striking rock drillers of Marikana thus 
differs in important respects from its earlier forebears. It is not only that miners’ range of 
dependents has increased and their access to credit has widened while their means for repaying it 
– under the insecure conditions of contract labour and ongoing retrenchments – have shrunk; and 
that a far wider range of consumables are now considered essential. It is also that the mining 
 
 
companies no longer provide board and lodging to the increasingly substantial portion of their 
workforce that is subcontracted: the role of compounds has declined and miners are left to find 
their own accommodation and food using scarce resources in a setting of soaring prices. There is 
a sharp disparity between the promises of upward mobility through financial inclusion, and 
increasing precarity within the migrant workforce, as new forms of economic vulnerability 
combine with much older legacies of disenfranchisement in the mine economy, unsettling the 
stark dichotomy between job and no job (Cooper 1987:181). 
 
Conclusion 
The ideology that underwrites BoP finance (Prahalad 2004) claims an apparently universal ideal 
of economic and social mobility. But we have highlighted here how the project of ‘banking the 
unbanked’ takes on very specific local forms, as it grafts onto historical social, political and 
economic relations, drawing in and relying on the energies and resources of local actors and 
agencies as much as big corporate players such as banks and furniture retailers. These local 
responses embody the fact that migrant life has long required a careful balancing of 
responsibilities. Often thought of as caught between two geographical worlds and two divergent 
systems (although these of course are inextricably intertwined), migrants travel to earn a wage in 
a capitalist economy while finding ways to husband their resources and to honour obligations 
and reciprocities which arise in a seemingly less-than-capitalist one. Techniques used to keep 
wages aside and beyond migrants’ control have not only been used by various agents – rural 
patriarchs, traders, government authorities, appliance retailers – but also at times eagerly 
embraced by migrants themselves, in the knowledge that these resources will need to be guarded 
for the upkeep of home, for future retirement, or for the costs associated with death and burial. 
However, if credit has a positive aspect in that it allows a migrant to ‘borrow speculative 
resources from his/her own future and transform them into concrete resources to be used in the 
present’ (Peebles 2010:226), the motives of those who extend such loans cannot necessarily be 
assumed to be benevolent. In South Africa, where the ‘advantage to creditor’ principle has long 
been in evidence (Boraine & Roestoff 2002:4), there are signs that an increasingly financialised 
capitalism has irrevocably transformed the landscape within which migrants make their 
calculations about family obligations and the life that is to come. There are hints, however - in 
the collapse of African Bank as this article was going to press and the downgrading by Moody’s 
 
 
of the ‘big four’ banks as a result14 - that such financialisation will eventually have 
repercussions, in turn, for those creditors. 
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